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Abstract
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 the Communist
“threat” that plagued the West throughout the latter half of the 20th century all
but disappeared and was replaced with the “threat” of Islam. Prior to 9/11 Islam
was a largely misunderstood religion and, despite its emergence as a media
sensation in the past decade or so, very little headway has been made to better
understand it.
Often times this misunderstanding has led to latent, and at times
manifest, anti-Islamic sentiment and in many cases this anti-Islamic sentiment
has been directed at the mosque as the physical embodiment of Islam. Nowhere
can this relationship between the two be seen more clearly than in the case of
the media frenzy that erupted in summer 2010 over the proposed construction
of an Islamic center four blocks from Ground Zero. The debate centered on
whether the proposed project would be a mosque or a community center, but
inevitably evolved to question the motives of the projects backers and to portray
the project as a symbol of Islam’s domination of the West.
This project seeks to approach these issues from a scholarly point of
view, a view which has been largely neglected throughout the course of debate.
Before an analysis of this issue can be made, however, it is necessary to provide
a brief overview of the non-religious, particularly economic, political and social,
functions of the mosque during throughout the long, diverse history of Islam. As
such, this project provides a historical analysis of the mosque during the time of
the Prophet of Islam, the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates, the Ottoman Empire
and throughout the 20th century. This historical overview is followed by an
analysis of the Ground Zero Mosque, as compared to historical mosque function
and other present-day, religiously-based community centers to answer the
question: “is it a mosque or a community center?” This section will also seek to
dispel some inappropriately applied arguments against construction of the
project, and discuss the implications that this debate has had on Muslims in
America.
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I

For Dr. Bashiriyeh,
“The teacher who is indeed wise does not bid you to enter the house of
his wisdom but rather leads you to the threshold of your mind.”
-Khalil Gibran
Thank you.

II
Dear Future Honors Student,

My life Capstone experience was an emotional one that I seem to have
documented in Facebook statuses.
Sometimes I wanted to quit:
“I swear, if I get called an Orientalist one more time I'm throwing my
Capstone in the trash and walking away.”
Sometimes I didn’t have the motivation to write:
“Dear capstone. You are forty pages long and I need you to be sixty. Want
to know what I’d rather do than expand you? Set you on fire. Set you on
fire and dance on your ashes.”
And sometimes I had to sacrifice my social life and sleep:
“Capstone-ing at the library until the wee hours of the morning.”
Yes, the Capstone project was not easy. It took a great deal of time and effort.
But it was well worth it when I was able to post statuses like this:
“I GOT THE CRITICAL LANGUAGE SCHOLARSHIP!!”
And this:
“I GOT INTO THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS FOR GRAD SCHOOL!!”

My advice to you? Write early, write often and write about something you’re
passionate about. You’ll probably get frustrated and want to quit at some point,
but completing the project has major benefits. Stick with it and vent when
necessary.
Good luck!
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Introduction
The United States has often been described as the great melting pot; a
society in which many and varied peoples and cultures are combined into one,
heterogeneous common culture. While such cultural assimilation may have been
sought during the mid- to late- eighteen hundreds, the melting pot metaphor
does not provide an accurate depiction of American society today. Though there
does appear to be a common culture to some extent, by and large people tend
to maintain their individual cultural and religious practices. Thus, it may be
better to describe collective American culture as a tapestry in which the
individual threads combine but also remain distinct.
Although such metaphors have historically been most applicable to
American society, with relatively recent advances in transportation and
communications they have now become more applicable to the world as a
whole. Not only have geographies become pluralistic, but also formerly
regulated ideas and practices, for example culture and religion. For better or
worse, the world is dynamically changing because peoples and cultures that have
historically been concentrated in one particular region of the world can now be
found virtually everywhere. A prime example of this can be seen by analyzing the
population data concerning the Lebanese Diaspora. Today of an estimated
fourteen million Lebanese living in the Diaspora, nearly seven million reside in
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Brazil.1 Meanwhile, while only an estimated three million Lebanese live in
Lebanon.2 Such patterns of immigration have real cultural implications for the
countries and societies that interact with them.
But what, you may ask, do such migratory patterns have to do with the
mosque? The answer? Everything. Although Islam, much like Christianity and
Judaism, has no distinct borders historically it has been perceived as a purely
Middle Eastern phenomenon. In the last century or so, this phenomenon has
changed and regions where the Muslim population was previously small, have
seen a dramatic increase in the number of adherents to the Islamic faith. For
example, as a result of immigration and birth, the Muslim population in the US,
Europe and the world over has increased dramatically during the last several
decades. Because studies concerning the Muslim population of the United States
and are “seldom based on any credible scientific methodology,”3 there are no
accurate figures reporting the exact number of Muslims living in the United
States. Keeping this fact in mind, existing estimates range from as few as 1.3
million4 to more than five million5. Meanwhile, it is estimated that some 49

1

Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Middle East and North Africa: Lebanon," Travel and Living
Abroad, accessed April 23, 2011, last modified September 30, 2010
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by-country/countryprofile/middle-east-north-africa/lebanon.
2
Central Intelligence Agency, "Middle East: Lebanon," The World Fact Book, accessed April
23, 2011, last modified April 6, 2011, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/le.html
3
Tom W. Smith, "Review: The Muslim Population of the United States: The Methodology of
Estimates," The Public Opinion Quarterly 66, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 414, accessed April 23, 2011,
JSTOR.
4
Barry A. Kosmin and Ariela Keysar, American Religious Identification Survey Summary Report,
5, accessed April 23, 2011, http://www.americanreligionsurvey-aris.org/reports/
ARIS_Report_2008.pdf.
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million Muslims currently live in Europe.6 Though these numbers represent
mere fractions of the total populations7 of Europe and the U.S., the various
terror attacks perpetrated in the name of Islam over the last two decades has
created an air of suspicion in the collective Western subconscious concerning the
perceived “basic nature” of Islam and the motives of its adherents.
This suspicion has led to latent, and at times manifest, anti-Islamic
sentiment. Although this anti-Islamic sentiment has taken many forms it has
often been directed at the mosque as a physical manifestation of Islam. In
Switzerland in 2009, for example, the government banned the future
construction of new minarets. Meanwhile in the United States, in fall 2010 alone,
anti-Islamic sentiment manifested in the vandalism of several mosques including:
“construction equipment set afire at a mosque site in Murfreesboro, Tennessee;
a plastic pig with graffiti thrown into a mosque in Madera, California and
teenagers shooting outside a mosque in upstate New York during Ramadan
prayers.”8
Despite a seemingly endless stream of media coverage concerning Islam,
the so-called “Islamization of America,” and the threat of a new, “Islamic
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Susan Headden, "Understanding Islam," US News and World Report, April 7, 2008, page #s,
accessed April 23, 2011, http://www.usnews.com/news/religion/articles/2008/04/07/
understanding-islam.
6
Houssain Kettani, "Muslim Population in Europe" (paper presented at the 2009 International
Conference on Social Sciences and Humanities), Polytechnic University of Puerto Rico, accessed
April 23, 2011, http://www.pupr.edu/hkettani/papers/ICSSH2009Europe.pdf.
7
Assuming that these estimates are correct, Muslims make up less than 7% of the population of
Europe and slightly less than 2% of the population of the United States.
8
Laurie Goodstein, "American Muslims Ask, Will We Ever Belong?" The New York Times,
September 5, 2010, accessed April 23, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/06/us/06muslims.html.
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caliphate,”9 very little is ever said about the mosque or the role that it plays both
in Islam and for the Muslim community at-large. When the mosque does receive
media coverage it is discussed as a veritable monolith serving one, sometimes
two, functions. First, the mosque is discussed as a place for Muslim worship and
second it is discussed as breeding ground for Islamic extremism, militancy and
terrorism. Such interpretations are deeply problematic from an academic
standpoint because they fail to address the fluid, dynamic nature of mosque
function through the centuries.
Thus, in the pages that follow I will seek to provide a general overview of
the functions of the mosque throughout Islam’s history. Given the controversies
and confusion surrounding the mosque, as well as the motives of its patrons, it is
prudent to more clearly define the lens through which this study will view the
mosque. The mosque is obviously a religious institution, and the mosque as a
physical establishment serves to meet the religious needs of adherents.
However, the mosque serves a variety of other less obvious purposes and it is on
these purposes that this study will focus. In particular, the mosque will be
viewed as a political, economic and social institution, interacting with and
reacting to society at-large.
For the purposes of this study, it is not inherently necessary to reconcile
the differences between the various sects of Islam. Islam is not a monolith and
sectarian divisions run much deeper than Sunni v. Shia. Today, there are over 70

9

Glenn Beck, Fox News Channel, February 1, 2011.
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different sects.10 While the customs and practices, whether religious, economic,
social or otherwise, vary from sect to sect, it is also important to recognize that
each sect varies from mosque to mosque, country to country and region to
region. Thus, every mosque functions differently than the next. This study will
attempt to reconcile these differences and present a general explanation
concerning mosque function.
It is not enough, however, to study the various functions of the mosque
in the 20th century in order to understand the functions of the mosque today.
Throughout the various phases and epochs of Islamic history the mosque’s
functions have fluctuated and adapted to the political, economic and social
realities of the time. To understand the diverse roles of the mosque today, in
traditionally Islamic and non-Islamic societies, it is necessary to understand how
mosque functions evolved, changed and were sometimes reincorporated after
long periods of dormancy.
This historical study will then be applied to explain, discuss and analyze
the controversy surrounding the so-called “Ground Zero Mosque,” now officially
named the Park51 Community Center. For six months in 2010 this proposed
project, slated to be constructed two city blocks from the site of the September
11, 2001 terror attack on the World Trade Center in New York City, was at the
forefront of American political and media debate. Probably the most popular
themes of these debates were whether the project was a mosque or a

10

Diane Morgan, Essential Islam (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2010), 221.
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community center, whether the men and women behind the project were
“peaceful Muslims” or had connections to terrorist networks and whether the
project itself would be a symbol of peace, tolerance and interfaith cooperation
or of Islam’s domination of the West.
Such a discussion of this controversy is crucial because, although Park51
is only one establishment, it represents America’s latent anti-Islamic sentiment
as a whole. Park51 has become a scapegoat for the fear and confusion that has
become associated with Islam in the collective American subconscious. By
discussing these fears—how they originate and evolve—we may begin to, where
appropriate, dispel them.

7

The Mosque under the Prophet and the Rightly-guided Caliphs
Twelve years elapsed between the Prophet Muhammad’s first revelation
in 610 CE and the construction of the Islamic community’s first mosque. During
this early phase of Islam in Mecca the need for a mosque was significantly
overshadowed by the societal consequences of establishing one. At this time,
the Prophet and his small collection of followers faced violence and oppression
from the ruling tribe of Mecca, the Quraish. In the eyes of the Quraishi leaders
Muhammad’s message challenged their tribal affiliations and customs and, in
doing so, threatened Mecca’s position as a major trading center. The violence
and oppression directed towards the believers of Islam and Muhammad were
used as tools to prevent the collapse of the existing social order and gradually
became commonplace. By 622 CE, conditions in Mecca for the earliest Muslim
converts were no longer safe and the Prophet along with his followers were
forced to emigrate to Yathrib (Medina), a nearby town, in order to evade
persecution.
Up until this emigration, known as the Hijra, the Muslim community
utilized open spaces, particularly the Ka‘ba, for communal prayer (salat). The
Ka’ba was located in the center of Mecca and “housed the 360 idols of tribal
patron deities, and was the site of a great annual pilgrimage and fair.”11 In
addition to communal prayer at the Ka’ba it was also deemed permissible, and
not uncommon, for believers to pray in their homes. This second practice
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John L. Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011), 3.
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became increasingly common as persecution of the believers escalated.12 As a
direct result of the persecution and subjugation of Muhammad and his earliest
followers, the foundations for a “true” mosque in Mecca were not laid until after
its conquest by the Islamic armies in 630CE/8AH.
As was previously mentioned, by 622 CE conditions for the Prophet and
his Meccan followers had become too dangerous. Adherents to the Muslim faith
had been beaten, starved, subjected to boycotts and in a few cases they were
even killed. As a result, the Prophet began to look for a safe haven in neighboring
cities whose tribes could offer protection from the Quraish. Eventually, in
exchange for his services as arbitrator, the tribes of Medina agreed to grant
sanctuary to the Muslims. Upon arrival, some accounts claim that among the
first things the Prophet did was to build a mosque on land that the tradition
states he purchased from two orphans. Other accounts, however, claim that the
Prophet selected the site for his dwelling and the site became the community’s
mosque as well. This will be discussed in more detail later.
This new mosque met the religious needs of the Muslim community in
Medina, which was comprised of Meccan Immigrants (Muhajirun) and Medinese
Helpers (Ansar). Although it was simple in structure it became the center for
communal prayer and a place from which the poor of Medina could come to
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Mohammed Zafeeruddin, Mosque in Islam (n.p.: Qazi Publishers and Distributors, 1996), 5.
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receive food and alms.13 In addition to being a place of prayer and charity, the
Prophet’s Mosque (al-masjed al-nabi), served many and varied functions within
the early Muslim community:
“Laws were made here. The Muslim army was given training. This
was the camp from where armies were dispatched to war fronts.
Delegations from foreign tribes and countries were received here.
There first school or University of Islamic learning was located
here. The Prophet (peace be upon him) held his court here, and
heard and decided disputes. And the transgressors were kept in
confinement here.”14
In addition to the functions listed above, the Prophet’s Mosque also became the
center for distribution of booty acquired during the various caravan raids carried
out by the Prophet and his army of believers. Thus, the Prophet’s Mosque met
not only the religious needs of the new community, but also its administrative,
educational, military, and judicial needs as well.15
In conjunction with these functions, the site of the mosque also served as
the Prophet’s place of residence. Some Islamic scholars even argue that this was
the original intent for the property that Mohammed purchased, and that its
function as a mosque was secondary to its function as Muhammad’s dwelling
and there is some evidence to support this claim, but such claims are difficult to
verify given the sheer number of accounts of the Prophet’s life. Prior to the
advent of Islam the term masjid was used to describe “a shrine or a cult building
13

Karen Armstrong, Muhammed A Prophet for our Time (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2007),
102.
14
ibid.
15
It is worth mentioning that there was a mosque built prior to the Prophet’s Mosque. This
mosque in Quba’ was built while Muhammed was in route to Medina during the Hijra. However,
as it was not the central mosque and it did not function largely like the mosques in future
garrison towns, it will not be elaborated on here.
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rendered sacred by the ground upon which it was built or the idol that it
housed.”16 By this definition, the Ka’ba was a masjid. The plot of land which
tradition states the Prophet’s camel wandered to and that the Prophet then
selected as the construction site, fits neither of these specifications though the
term masjid was, in any case, adopted to describe the mosque. Regardless of his
intentions however, this location became both the site of the Prophet’s dwelling
and the mosque for the Umma in Medina and, in the end, Muhammad’s primary
objective is largely irrelevant; the site functioned as both mosque and dwelling.
Around the edge of the courtyard located at the front of the mosque the
Prophet had small huts built for each of his wives and in doing so he showed that
“the sexual, the sacred, and the domestic could - and, indeed, must - be
integrated.”17 In other words, the plurality of functions of the mosque was
evident from the outset; it was meant to be both religious and social. For
Mohammed, the mosque was meant to be the center of not only the
community, but the family as well.
The next mosque in Islam did not come into being until the Prophet’s
return to, and conquest of, Mecca in 628 CE. It has been said that one of
Mohammed’s first actions upon entering the city was to enter the Ka’ba and
destroy the 360 idols which were housed inside, thus restoring its purpose of

16

Francis E. Peters, Muhammed and the Origins of Islam (Albany, NY: State University of New
York Press, 1994), 194.
17
Karen Armstrong, Muhammed A Prophet for our Time (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2007),
104.
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worshipping the one, true God.18 With that, the Ka’ba became and remains the
most important mosque in Islam, and is the direction towards which Muslims the
world over direct their prayers.
It is important to note that the importance of the Ka’ba transcends the
conquest of Mecca. It is revealed in the Qur’an that the Ka’ba was built by Adam,
destroyed in the great flood, and was later rebuilt by the prophet Abraham with
the intention that it would serve as the House of God and function as a place in
which He alone would be worshipped.19 Thus, Mohammed’s removal of the
tribal deities was seen in the eyes of believers, not exclusively as an affront on
the polytheistic nature of Meccan society but also as a return of the Ka’ba to its
original purpose and society’s return to monotheism. Therefore it can be, and
often is, argued that the Ka’ba, not Masjid al-Nabawi, was actually the world’s
first mosque.
During the four years that followed Muhammad’s triumph over Mecca,
he sought to further extend and consolidate his authority in Arabia and gradually
began to expand his control through a combination of alliances with and
conquests of neighboring tribes. Through expansion, the surrounding tribes were
exposed to Islam and a new way of life that influenced and changed their
existing political and social order, in addition to their private lives and religious
beliefs and practices. This new way was often completely foreign to them and so
while some chose to accept and submit to the message of Islam, others chose to
18
19

Ibid.
Quran 2:125-127, ( Yusef Ali Translation)
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maintain their traditional ways of life. The price for refusing to accept Islam and
thus remaining in perceived a state of ignorance (jihilliya) was allegiance to
Medina by way of paying a tax (jeziyya). This system functioned relatively well
until 632 CE when the Prophet died and the Umma (Muslim community) was left
without a leader. As often happens when there is oscillation in the seats of
power, order was not initially maintained.
Although the issue of succession was decided on relatively quickly, with
the Prophet’s close companion Abu Bakr assuming the role of community leader
(Caliph) from 632-634CE, it was more difficult to legitimize his authority and
reunite the tribes under the banner of Islam. Many tribes had rebelled upon
hearing of Muhammad’s death, abandoning Islam and resuming their pre-Islamic
traditions. Many believed that their tribal allegiance had “been based on a
political pact with Medina that ceased with the Prophet’s death.”20 The Umma
was threatened with the possibility of dissolution, and in an attempt to combat
this, Abu Bakr launched a series of battles known as the Wars of Apostasy (the
Ridah Wars), which were by and large successful in “consolidating Muslim rule
over the entire Arabian Peninsula, and thus preserved the unity and solidarity of
the Islamic state.”21 This state was then expanded dramatically during the reign
of the remaining “Rightly-Guided Caliphs” the Caliphates of Umar (634-644),
Uthman (644-656) and Ali (656-661).

20
21

John L. Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011), 3.
ibid.

13

During the expansion that took place under these “Rightly Guided”
Caliphs, the Arab-Islamic armies “would not occupy conquered cities but
[instead] establish garrison towns nearby.”22 It was from these towns that the
various conquered territories would be managed. The mosque during this
period, emerged as the geographic center of the town around which all other
buildings would be erected. Under Abu Bakr, the function of the mosque
remained largely the same, with one exception being that the mosque was no
longer a place of dwelling. The real change to the mosque came under ‘Umar,
who limited the mosque’s functions in the conquered territories by building
fortresses, barracks, stables and other military buildings separate from the
physical structure of the mosque which eliminated the mosque as the military
center for the Islamic armies. Other official buildings were also built, including
treasuries and jails, which largely truncated the hitherto administrative, judicial
and economic functions of the mosques.
Though conversion in the conquered territories was accepted, it was not
usually encouraged. Non-Muslims living in the conquered territories were
required to pay taxes. Thus, from an economic perspective higher conversion
rates meant decreased revenues for the Caliph in Medina. It was due in large
part to this that garrison towns were established and the full-scale takeover of
cities like Fustat, Basra, and Kufa were typically avoided.23 The conquered
peoples were usually allowed to maintain their individual customs and continued
22
23

ibid. 43
ibid.
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to function largely as they had prior to conquest. The mosque, for non-Muslims,
was merely a place to which their tax was paid.
As such, during the era of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs, the political,
economic and judicial legitimacy of the Caliph in Medina waned, as did the
Caliph’s direct involvement in the political, economic and judicial happenings in
newly conquered territories. This is likely due in large part to the personality of
the Prophet himself. The Prophet’s legitimacy was not based on his social status
as he did not a member of the upper echelons of Meccan society. His legitimacy,
then, stemmed from his charismatic personality. According to German
sociologist Max Weber, charisma is the recognition of “a certain quality of an
individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and
treated as endowed with supernatural, superman, or at least specifically
exceptional qualities.”24 Thus, the legitimacy that the Prophet enjoyed in Medina
was not a reflection of his charismatic personality, but of the peoples’
acknowledgment of his charismatic attributes.
The Rightly-Guided Caliphs did not share in the Prophet’s legitimacy or
charisma. Often times their legitimacy went widely unrecognized, and as a result
it was harder for them to function successfully in all of the roles that Muhammad
had assumed. In a society where the leader’s legitimacy is in question and not all
of the population subscribes to the religious views of the political establishment,

24

Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, "Introduction," in Max Weber on Charisma and Institution Building
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1968), xviii.
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the exclusive use of a religious institution like the mosque as the administrative,
judicial and economic center is impractical at best. It was not until the rise of the
However, despite the administrative changes that took place in the mosque the
various garrison towns, following the Wars of Apostasy the Caliphs in Medina
were able to consolidate their legitimacy and the Prophet’s mosque regained its
central position until the rise of the Ummayads in 661 CE.

16

The Mosque under the Umayyads and the Abbasids
The multi-faceted nature of the Mosque in Islamic society did not change
much for the remainder of the era of the Caliphs. Under both the Umayyads and
the Abbasids, the functions of the mosque continued to function similar to the
ways it had under the four Rightly-Guided Caliphs. During this era, which began
with the rise of the Umayyads in 661 CE and was brought to an with the Mongol
invasion of Baghdad, the Abbasid capital, in 1258 CE, the mosque continued to
play an important role in the political and social happenings in conquered lands
of the Islamic Empire.
Despite the Prophet and Rightly-Guided Caliphs’ hesitancy to convert
conquered people to Islam for fear of a loss of tax revenue, the peoples of the
conquered lands during Islamic expansion still appear to have converted,
although perhaps voluntarily, because mosque construction exploded. Estimates
made by a contemporary observer claimed that “there were 7,000 mosques in
Basra (Iraq) alone” and “as many as 30,000 in the city of Baghdad.”25 Though
these estimates are likely highly exaggerated, they speak to the fact that
mosques were no longer exclusive to the garrison towns. By 750 CE Islam had
become a deeply-rooted part of life in all corners of the Islamic Empire, which
stretched from modern day Spain and north Africa in the west, to Persia and
Central Asia in the east.

25
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It is during this time that we see the emergence of the term jami to
describe one aspect of the mosque. This term, according to Mohammed Makki
Sibai, is either derived from the Arabic verb jama, which means ‘to gather,’ or
from the Arabic word juma which means ‘Friday.’26 Regardless of whether the
term jami originally referred to the physical place in which people gather or the
place where the obligatory Friday prayer was performed, the mosque became
both a communal prayer space, and a veritable hub of social interaction. In
general the mosque served the social, political and educational needs of the
community, as described below, in addition to meeting their religious ones.
In terms of its social functioning, under the Umayyads and the Abbasids,
the mosque served a myriad of purposes. They became spaces where special
occasions would be celebrated, where the Caliphs would receive foreign
dignitaries, where tales of morality would be told by various speakers, and
where poetry would be recited. The mosque was also a place that people would
visit in times of great need. Occasionally mosques would serve as places for
refuge and “when drought, plague, and pestilence struck, people went to the
mosque to pray for help.”27 Although the function of the mosque as the primary
residence of the Caliph was ended immediately following the death of the
Prophet, during the era of expansion the mosque became “a shelter for the
poor, the stranger and the traveler.” 28 Fortunately, trade had also sprung up in

26
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and around the mosques, which afforded these individuals with access to
amenities like water and food. In some instances, patrons were even afforded
access to medical care.29
During this period, the mosque also retained a political role, following in
the tradition of the Prophet himself. While mosques continued to be built with
separate administrative buildings nearby, as mosques began to spring up outside
of the garrison towns they were built adjacent, if not connected, to the dar alimara (governor’s house).30 In some cases, the mosque even served as the
treasury and was often used as the site of the physical, monetary transactions
themselves.31 Similarly the mosque remained the judicial center of the Muslim
community with appointed judges (Qadi) continuing to represent the Caliph in
the main mosque in each territory, just as they had under the Rashidun. Unlike
the judges during the era of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs, starting during the
Abbasid period under Caliph Mehdi, the office of chief Qadi was instituted and it
was on his shoulders that all judicial functions fell.32
The educational role of the mosque greatly expanded during the reign of
the Umayyads and the Abbasids. While under the Prophet the mosque became
the center for religious learning, under these two Caliphates education expanded
beyond the realm of Islamic teachings. In addition to the study of religious
29

ibid.
The Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam, s.v. "Masdjed."
31
ibid.
32
Amir Hassan Siddiqi, Caliphate and Sultanate in Medieval Persia, 2nd ed. (Karachi, Pakistan:
Jamiyat-Ul-Falah, 1963), 28.

30
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dogma and the Arabic language, students at the madrasas (schools) would also
study subjects known today as history, geography, economics, political science,
philosophy, chemistry, physics, arithmetic, algebra and geometry, medicine,
engineering and astronomy. Students, both male and female, would travel
extraordinary distances to attend these schools but it was not the reputation of
the school that they sought, instead they “sought eminent scholars, prized their
inspirations, and prided themselves on obtaining certificates from them.”33 It
was during this period as well that the first libraries were attached to mosques,
first in al-Andalus (Muslim Spain) and then gradually in all of the territories.34
It is important to note that not all mosques were multifaceted in every
sense. Yes, each shared in common the basic function, that being a prayer space,
but outside of that, mosques retained individuality. For example, not all
mosques served as centers of non-religious learning. The curriculum at each
mosque was based on the particular knowledge of individual lecturer. Before the
invention and practice of using printed books, education of students at any given
madrasa was conducted through dictation.35 Thus, a teacher was only able to
instruct subjects in which he was particularly well-versed.
In a similar vein, not all mosques played a central role in regional politics.
This function was typically reserved for the mosque attached to or located near
the dar al-imara. By-and-large however, the majority of mosques “provided for
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the needs and requirements of its patrons” and, although not all mosques were
madrasas, or schools, in general “the distinction between madrasa and ordinary
mosque was very slight” as both served as centers for the study of Islam. 36
It is worth noting that this “Golden Age” of the Caliphate coincided with
the historical reality of the Crusades, which took place from 1095 to 1453 and
during the struggle to re-conquer Spain from 1000 to 1492.37 It has been argued
recently that it is this period that the Muslim armies began to take previously
existing religious establishments and convert them into Mosques. Nowhere is
this better reflected in the present discourse surrounding the establishment of
the great mosque in Cordoba, a subject that will be discussed at length in later
pages.38 However to pinpoint this occurrence as an affront on the Spanish
peoples, a direct attack on Christianity, or a show of Islamic dominance would be
to ignore the historical realities surrounding the Islamic expansion. The practice
of adapting of older sanctuaries and churches can be seen as early as 705 in
Damascus where al-Walid b. ‘Abd al-Malik converted some ten churches into
mosques.39
Although this practice did occur quite frequently in regards to churches,
Christian worship places were not the only older sanctuaries to be converted by
Muslim invaders. Synagogues as well as Zoroastrian temples in Iran also saw
conversion under the new, Islamic administrations. It is equally important to
36
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note that though the Islamic invaders often confiscated pre-existing religious
establishments, not all of these confiscated localities became mosques. Some
became administrative headquarters, while others became private dwellings.40
Furthermore, this practice was not exclusive to Islam. When Christian Crusaders
conquered Jerusalem in 1099, the Dome of the Rock was converted to a Church
and the al-Aqsa mosque was converted to a residence for the king.41 At the same
time however, many churches were and mosques were left untouched and
continued to serve the needs of their respective religious communities.
For better or for worse, the gradual spread of Islam in the Middle East,
northern Africa, southern Europe and parts of eastern Asia, the Islamic Empire
under the Umayyads and the Abbasids left an indelible mark on the various
native populations. They brought with them “a system of state, society, law,
thought and art” with “religion as its unifying, eventually dominating factor”42
and it was often the mosque that served as the central hub for this unification.
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The Mosque under the Ottoman Empire
After the Mongol invasion in 1258, the lands of the Islamic Empire fell under
foreign rule for some 42 years. During this time Islam, though not subjugated,
went largely without the forceful leadership that it had enjoyed under the
Prophet, the Rashidun, the Umayyad and the Abbasids and the umma lay
splintered under the rule of the Mamluks in present-day Egypt, Syria and parts of
north Africa and the Seljuks in present-day Turkey, Iraq and Iran. It was not until
1280CE that the Ottoman Empire began to emerge as a force capable of
reunifying the lands that the Abbasids had conquered and controlled. This
Empire emerged from the shadows of the Byzantine Empire, which at its height,
between 1512 and 1566 under Selim I and Suleyman the Magnificent,
encompassed present-day Turkey, the Balkans, much of northern Africa, parts of
Arabia as well as parts of the Levant.4344 Although many of these lands were
Muslim already and the Ottoman state was run in accordance to Islam and
Islamic institutions, in general the mosque during this period no longer enjoyed
the levels of political, economic, and educational importance and sovereignty it
had under the Abbasids. However, as the source of the Ottoman Sultan’s
legitimacy the mosque and the ‘ulama were “joined together at the very top” of
government and economics. Thus, the Ottoman Empire became one marked by
parallel institutions.
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From the outset, the Ottoman sultans “maintained and nurtured an
important separation between religion as an institution and religion as a system
of meanings and relations that connected a community of faith.”45 Thus,
administrative tasks that had formerly fallen on the shoulders of the qadis or
that were carried out in the mosques connected to the dar al-imara by the
governor were, under the Ottomans, delegated to institutions outside of the
religious realm. However, the mosque remained at the physical center of
Ottoman principalities but shared its position of physical prominence with the
city or town’s main suq (market) and, in the case of large cities, the citadel. The
citadel assumed over-sight of administrative tasks previously cared for by the
mosques. For example, the jails and garrisons that had previously been physically
located in the mosques became located within the walls of the citadel.
By and large, Islam and the mosque during the Ottoman Empire became
a bureaucratized tool of the state. Those at the top of the ‘ulama hierarchy in
the larger cities were trained in the palace schools, worked in the administration,
and sought to achieve higher rank in the bureaucratic system. As tools in the
hands of the sultan, the ‘ulama were unable to oppose policies that were
harmful or disadvantageous to Muslims and, with their increased
bureaucratization, or incorporation into the Ottoman political machine they
gained “enormous social power as teachers, preachers, controllers of
45
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endowments, judges, and provincial officials.”46 This power, however, came in
the form of a double-edged sword because it limited their authority as religious
clerics and representatives of the interests of the Muslim community at large.
The inability of the 'ulama to operate independently of the central Ottoman
state is reflected quite clearly in the administration mosques during the Ottoman
Empire. The mosque became a venue for the Ottomans to access the emotional
climate of its Muslim constituency. The Friday sermon was designed to include,
and imams (Friday prayer leaders) were obligated to incite, a pledge of fealty to
the sultan and any refusal to make this pledge was tantamount to opposing the
legitimacy of the state. Friday prayer also became a venue for propagation of
Ottoman policy and legitimacy. With the 'ulama under state control and few
mosques permitted by the sultan and his administration to be used for Friday
prayer, propagation of the state was not difficult to implement.
Although in large part the sultan used the 'ulama and the Islamic
establishment as a means to propagate his legitimacy, the upper echelons of the
'ulama were by no means laymen or puppets of the state. This can be seen in the
position and embodiment of the mufti. Although many of the ‘ulama
incorporated into the state system were largely unqualified, uneducated, and
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had little influence this was not the case with the muftis.47 While the sheiks
(preachers), khatibs (Friday prayer leaders), imams (daily prayer leaders), and
seids (those claiming relation to the Prophet) largely remained subordinate to
the state,48 the position of mufti was highly esteemed and played a vital role in
in the Ottoman judiciary and as a result in Ottoman society. Muftis served as
advisors to the judges in the cities and as they were highly trained in religious
laws their expertise was often taken into account in, or even used to settle,
disputes regarding pending legal cases. Although the mufti usually ranked behind
the judge, the Mufti of the sultan actually outranked all government officials
excluding the sultan himself and occasionally the grand vizier. However the
Mufti, as the executor of the sharia, held great power in that he could deem the
actions of the sultan to be un-Islamic and call for his removal from power. In
general however, the average mufti enjoyed a level of authority second only to
the judges. However, these judges were also typically members of the ‘ulama
which meant that the judicial system of the Ottoman Empire, including
interpretation and implementation of laws, was controlled almost exclusively by
the ‘ulama.
It is important to note that not all Islamic institutions were afforded the
same level imminence that the muftis enjoyed. Other nodes of power, like that
of education in the madrasas, saw their influence altered with the creation of
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parallel Ottoman institutions. Under the Prophet, the Rashidun, the Ummayads
and the Abbasids administration of the madrasas remained largely independent
of the state. Madrasas were attached to the mosques and the type of education
a student could receive there depended largely on the school of jurisprudence to
which a mosque’s clergy subscribed. Under the Ottomans however, a new
system of schooling existed parallel to the Islamic system. These “palace schools”
were not restricted by Islamic dogma and could therefore teach Islam and
theology in addition to the sciences and philosophy. These schools were
considered a “life-long system” that provided for not only students’ intellectual
expansion but for their physical preparedness.49 Most of the students trained in
these palace schools were either future soldiers, bureaucrats or other
government officials.
This is not to say that madrasas disappeared, rather that the palace
schools allowed for the teaching of subjects that were often construed as “unIslamic.” But yet again, this did not mean that the madrasas adhered to literalist
interpretations of the Qur’an. In fact “there was a preference that the books
which were read, particularly on religious subjects, in the madrasas and the
teachers who taught them should be exclusively from the Hanafi school,”50
which is relatively liberal and supports the implementation of ijtihad
(independent reasoning) in addition to the Qur’an, hadiths and sunna as sources
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of Islamic jurisprudence. However, because of the inclination of the non-clerical
political elite towards the Hanifi School, this policy was not strictly enforced. By
and large curriculums were determined by the inclination of the teachers. Still,
under the Ottomans the scope of perspectives offered in the curriculum of the
madrasas was narrowed and focused more specifically on theology and Islamic
sharia while the palace schools focused more directly on philosophy and the
modern sciences.51 It was these schools, not the madrasas, that were the
preferred educational institution for the Ottoman court and it is this preference
that marks the shift away from the mosque by the ruling elite.52
In general, the mosque maintained its status as a social institution
throughout the centuries of Ottoman rule. It was in the area of political power
where the mosque and the ‘ulama lost much of their authority. However, one
area in which the ‘ulama were able to maintain their individuality and their
autonomy was the oversight and control of the waqfs (religious endowments). In
fact, it is said that one-third of all Ottoman land was designated for waqfs.53
Though much of this was granted to the ‘ulama from the various sultans, the
revenues from these lands did not find their way back to the central treasury.
Profits and revenues coming from the waqfs went strictly to the ‘ulama, making
them one of the only independent groups with a financial base to rival the
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Imperial Treasury. In general, the mosque maintained its status as a social
institution throughout the centuries of Ottoman rule.
It is important to note that while these developments reflect the nature
of changing ‘ulama-state relations during the peak years of the Ottoman Empire,
the authority of the ‘ulama extended only as far as the umma. The Ottomans
implemented the millet system under which they “considered the non-Muslim
subjects autonomous but dependent peoples whose internal social, religious and
communal life was regulated by their own religious organizations, but whose
leaders were appointed by, and responsible to, a Muslim state.”54 This policy was
in line with the treatment of the non-Muslims under previous Islamic
governments and did not serve to undermine the power of the ‘ulama. Instead,
it upheld the status quo. This tolerance however did not quell Ottoman attempts
to convert non-believers to a religion which reflected Ottoman benevolence, an
“interest in the grandeur of Islam as a militant, expanding system,” and a desire
to increase “the wealth, numbers, and power of the state.”55 Thus, under the
Ottomans, the Muslim population increased dramatically.
It is easy to see that the function of the mosque and Islam changed
dramatically under the Ottoman Empire. In the formative years of Islam, the
mosque by way of the caliph was the most important institution in all of
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Islamdom. This was not the case under the Ottoman sultans. During this final
phase of Islamic empire, the mosque became an institution separate from and
largely subordinate to the ruling elite. However, the ruling elite also depended
on the ‘ulama for legitimacy. Thus it was the ‘ulama, not the mosque, who
became the key players in political life while the mosque remained a largely
social institution.
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The Orientalist Legacy and its Implications for Discussions of Islam
It is prudent, now, to take a brief intermission from the historical
overview, so as to discuss the various discourses surrounding Islam and the
mosque as its physical manifestation. Such discourses have played a major role
in shaping the body of work that has emerged concentrating on Islam in the 20th
century and beyond. It is only with these arguments and counter-arguments in
mind that we may proceed to analyze the mosque and its functions, so as to
discern fact from fiction.
In his famous work, Orientalism, acclaimed scholar Edward Said argued
that ever since Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798, an uneven power
relationship has existed between the West and the Orient. This relationship has
been one “of power, of domination, and of varying degrees of a complex
hegemony” of the West over the Orient.56 Thus, the relationship existing
between the Orient and the West has not been reciprocal. By virtue of the
nature of this relationship, the West has attempted to project itself on to the
Orient, rejecting its cultures and customs as backwards, violent and
unproductive. In response to this practice of projection, Said argued that
“neither the term Orient nor the concept of the west has any ontological
stability; each is made up of human effort, partly affirmation, partly
identification of the “Other.”57 Thus, for Said, Orientalism is a social construct
based on the aforementioned uneven power relationship rather than historical
56
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reality. Thus, the West is western only in terms of its not being Oriental, and
similarly the Orient is only oriental as a result of its not being western. This
tradition can easily be seen in relation to Islam and the mosque. Christianity and
the church, despite historically rising in the East, are the established norms in the
West. As a result, Islam and the mosque are identified in relation to these norms
and become the “other.” Though this is the very nature of discourse, in that
discourse frames our understanding of the world and relegates all components
of existence into easily identifiable groups that are discerned from one another
by nature of their dissimilarities, such stark contrasts and comparisons lead to
stereotypes. Said argued that it is necessary to abandon this method of
identification to move out of the realm of domination and marginalization and
into the realm of mutual understanding.
Despite the seminal works of scholars like Edward Said, the Orientalist
narrative continues to shape Western conceptions of the Orient, and more
recently Western concerns about the threat of radical Islam. As a result, in order
to properly study the social, economic and political functions of the mosque in
the 20th century, an attempt must be made to deconstruct the East-West
dichotomy, which has continued to exist and flourish despite the decline of
European colonialism since the end of WWII. Much of the literature of the 20th
century concerning Islam reflects “a western style for dominating, resurrecting,
and having authority over the Orient.”58 Even more alarming and detrimental to
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truly understanding the nature of Islam is that this tradition has been allowed to
continue in our 21st century discourse. On a daily basis Westerners are presented
with images of so-called Jihadists preforming salat with AK-47s at their sides.
Meanwhile preachers in Florida attempt to garner support for “Burn a Qur’an
Day.” The media portrays Islam as a monolithic, anti-Western and intolerant
religion whose sole purpose is to eradicate all things un-Islamic. This portrayal is
obviously troublesome, but the scholarly publications that seek to reinforce and
perpetuate these Orientalist stereotypes are far more problematic, indeed.
Perhaps the most seminal and simultaneously problematic scholarly
piece of the 20th century is Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis. First
published in Foreign Affairs magazine in 1993, this thesis makes several claims
about the nature of the post- Cold War “world order,” and the nature of Islam.
First Huntington claimed that in the post- Cold War era the “great divisions
among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.”59 He
divided the world into seven, possibly eight, civilizations, stating:
It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new
world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great
divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be
cultural. Nation-states will remain the most powerful actors in world
affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between
nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will
dominate global politics.60
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Secondly, Huntington asserted that this conflict is inevitable and that although
the “fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future,” the socalled Islamic civilization will be the perpetrator because, as Huntington argued,
“Islam has bloody borders.”61
Huntington’s thesis is troubling for a variety of reasons. His argument
tends to generalize the eight existing, yet vaguely-defined, civilizations, which
are problematic constructs to begin with, into only two; “the West” and “the
rest.” Furthermore, Huntington argued that this inevitable “cultural conflict” will
occur primarily between the West and the Confucian and Islamic civilizations
because “the crescent-shaped Islamic bloc, from the bulge of Africa to central
Asia, has bloody borders” and that, similarly, “a Confucian-Islamic connection
has emerged to challenge Western interests, values and power.”62 This rhetoric
clearly reflects the power relationship to which Said refers in Orientalism. By
juxtaposing the West with Islam, a label that Huntington problematically used to
describe the entirety of the Middle East, Huntington affirmed Western values
while ‘othering’ Islam and reinforcing Orientalist stereotypes. This thesis has
been criticized at length by scholars like Edward Said who argued that
Huntington’s contribution is sophomoric and reflects not familiarity with
“scholarship or theory” but with “journalism and popular demagoguery.”63
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Though Huntington and Said were perhaps the most influential and wellknown scholars of Orientalism, they are not alone in their feelings or findings.
Countless other scholars have commented on and studied the relationship
existing between traditionally Islamic lands and peoples and the traditionally
non-Islamic “West.” It is through the lenses of this dichotomy that the mosque,
as a monolith, has been seen in the 20th and 21st centuries.
For the purposes of this study, a Said-ian approach will be used to discuss
the nature of the mosque in the 20th century. Much of the literature written
about Islam in the past forty years has reflected a desire to understand its “basic
nature”; to dispel misconceptions, or give credence to the threat that Islam
poses for the rest of the world. Meanwhile, the mosque is discussed in very little
detail. Popular media on the other hand provides a, by and large, negative
portrayal of the mosque. Terrorists and terrorism are usually connected in some
way to a mosque, while mosques and their leaders are often accused of links to
terrorist cells.
No accurate statistics outlining what percentage of mosques has links to
terrorism or support, whether financially or otherwise, terrorist organizations.
Any existing figures would be inaccurate given the obvious secretive nature of
terrorist cells. What can be confirmed is that with 1.6 billion Muslims the world
over, the number of mosques serving the needs of terrorist organizations
represents a minuscule fraction of the whole.64 Much has been written and said
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about the mosque’s role in armed resistance but little has been published
concerning its more basic and individual functions.
Though the remainder of this study will seek to refrain from Orientalist
interpretations of the “facts,” it cannot be denied that Islamic fundamentalist
movements have emerged in a number of countries the world over. Though the
size, scope and intensity of these movements vary considerably, they have more
or less advocated for the decreased secularization, narrowing of the gap
between religious and nonreligious, of society and politics and a return to more
“Islamic” political and social systems. Such calls appear to be aimed at Middle
Eastern autocrats as much as Western-style democracy and society, which have
both become increasingly secular in the past century or so. It is crucial that we
keep this fact in mind when discussing Orientalist literature as the threats these
authors perceive are not entirely based in fiction.
Though the overview of the functions of the mosque in the 20th century
and beyond that follows will only very briefly discuss the mosque as being part
and parcel of Islamic terrorism, the broad-spectrum diversity of Islamic
movements will be kept in mind, so as to remain balanced and avoid
inappropriate generalizations. Thus, the 20th century mosque will be viewed
from as neutral a perspective as is possible with little analysis concerning what
Islam might be or may become.
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Islam and the Mosque in the 20th Century
The nature of the mosque between 622CE and the end of World War I in
1918 could be described, in a word, as dynamic. Meanwhile, the functions of the
mosque during any given period (the Prophet, the Rashidun Caliphs, the
Umayyads, etc.) were relatively consistent. Though there was some change to its
political, economic and military functions as time progressed, change was slow
and although the mosque lost its position as the venue for these activities the
‘ulama remained involved enough that these functions, though removed from
the mosque, were not separated from the Islamic tradition. Following the
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire after WWI, the Muslim world found itself
in a position it had not encountered since the Mongol invasion in 1258. The
Ottoman lands were divided between the French and the British as a result of
the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Under the Ummayads and the Abbasids the umma
and the state were one in the same. Under the Ottomans the umma and the
state enjoyed a marriage of mutual convenience. In the 20th Century, with very
few exceptions, the religious establishment and the Islamic community found
themselves not only separated from each other but separated from, and often in
opposition to, the state.
Not only did Muslims find themselves without an Empire for the first time
since the rise of the Ottomans, but they also found themselves governed by
colonial, European forces who brought with them new, foreign forms of
governance that left the masses and the former Ottoman Elite feeling obsolete.
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There were of course those in the newly established political and social order
that benefited from colonial rule, typically the landed class, and thus sought to
preserve it. However, by the 1950’s several movements had emerged calling for
the liberation of the former Ottoman lands from Colonialist powers.
Many of these movements were nationalist in nature, and though they
reflected the Islamic backgrounds of their leaders, their call was for
democratization, modernization and (quasi) secularization. This movement was
embodied by the desire for a pan-Arab state and was mainly propagated by
Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt, whose ideology called for the establishment of a
pan-Arab state based on socialist, but not anti-religious policies. Another more
secular, but still nationalist movement emerged in Turkey under Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk who sought to westernize all aspects of Turkish society, including
religion.
While pan-Arabism flourished during the 1950’s and 1960’s, it did so at
the expense of the clerical establishment. By the 1970’s so-called Islamic
Fundamentalists who had become disillusioned with the status quo began to
“challenge secular ideologies and Muslim governments by appeals to religious
ideology, symbols, and rhetoric”65 and call vehemently for the establishment of a
pan-Islamic state or, at the very least, the abandonment of “Western” style
policies and practices. Proponents of pan-Islamism argued that “Muslim public
65
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figures and movements that, despite being sincere in their concern for the
welfare of their people, have willingly allowed themselves to be captivated by
the enchantment of Western ideas of nationalism, socialism, liberalism,
economic development, democracy, and so on.”66 Thus, where pan-Arabism
called for the separation of religion and the state pan-Islamism argued that the
existence of such a state contradicted the very nature of Islam. Pan-Islamists
have argued that evidence for the overall failure of pan-Arabism and Arab
Socialism lies in the fact that under such regimes “poverty has soared, social
inequalities have become even more pronounced, corruption and moral
degradation are the order of the day, Muslim solidarity has been severely
eroded, and the Muslim world has been repeatedly attacked by the infidels.”67 It
was as a result of these failures of pan-Arabism and Arab Socialism, that panIslamism emerged from the shadows and sought to rectify the social ills of the
Islamic world through the political implementation of Islamic principles.
Regardless of the calls for puritan, Sharia based governments in the Muslim
world and a reunification of the umma, I would argue that the mosque and the
religious establishment throughout the mid- to late-twentieth century, though
increasingly politicized, have not been major players in most political arenas
(with the Islamic Republic of Iran existing as an obvious exception). In the pages
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that follow I will discuss the ways that this politicization has manifested in
various Muslim countries, including Egypt, Turkey, Algeria, Lebanon and Iran.
Perhaps the best example of this politicization of Islam and the mosque
can be seen in Egypt. In the wake of the Free Officers Movement and the
subsequent coup against King Farouk in 1952, the Revolutionary Command
Committee pushed the Islamists underground where they have remained for the
better part of the last sixty years. Thus, Islam and the mosque were removed,
by-and-large, from the political sphere. While many, like al-Azhar, were barred
from political participation, they were simultaneously politicized and brought
under state control, serving a purpose most adequately likened to that of the
mosque adjacent to the dar al-imara during the Umayyad and Abbasid
Caliphates. As a result Islamic groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, quite
literally, took to the streets. While barred from political participation, the
Brotherhood focused on “building mosques, schools, clinics, youth programs,
and other types of social infrastructure,” and as a result created a vast social
welfare network.68 This social welfare network has provided the clerical
establishment with a base for mobilization and the fostering of popular support.
They have in turn used this wide-spread support to remain a political
powerbroker despite their being banned from the political arena. As a result of
their social welfare programs, though officially banned from fielding candidates
68
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in elections, during the 2005 parliamentary elections 88 members of the
Brotherhood managed to win parliamentary seats after running as
independents.
The case of the Islamic movement in Turkey has been very similar to that
in Egypt. After the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk
emerged as the charismatic leader of the newly formed state of Turkey. His
political ideology was simple; he sought a western-style democracy and a form of
secularism where religion was entirely subordinate to the state, similar to the
French model of laicism. The Islamic movement that began to emerge in the
1950s but gained strength during 1970s and 1980s “was not an attempt to
return to the past, nor a rejection of modernity, the West, or non-Muslims.”69
Instead, the Islamic movement in Turkey reflected a belief that Islam and
democracy are not inherently incompatible. Until very recently, the Islamic
movement however was repressed, a fact made evident by the various military
coups and coups by warning that have taken place in the name of secularism
since 1960. Much like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Islamic politics in Turkey
were “strengthened over time by its vigorous grass-roots organization, its
responsiveness to local concerns and its effectiveness in tackling the nuts and
bolts of local government services such as sanitation and the provision of parks
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and youth centers.”70 The Welfare Party, established in 1983, was able to
achieve political success because it “offered constituents a simple, yet
comprehensive ideology that explained what was wrong with society and what
needed to be done, helped the poor to get healthcare, jobs and necessities, and
developed a sympathetic personal relationship with the voters.”71 As a result,
many were likely attracted to the Welfare Party because of its policies, not its
particular ideologies.
A similar situation has also emerged in Lebanon. In the wake of the Israeli
invasion of Lebanon in 1982 a Shi’ite resistance movement, Hezbollah, emerged
to confront Israeli forces. Though held responsible for, or thought to be involved
in a litany of terrorist attacks including but not limited to the 1983 bombing of
the U.S. embassy in Beirut and subsequent bombing of the U.S marine barracks,
the 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847 and the 1992 attack on the Israeli embassy
in Buenos Aires, Hezbollah has been able to transform from a militia into a
political party with a clearly defined political agenda. They were able to make
this transition as a result of their dedication to social welfare programs.
A similar example of this re-politicization of Islam can be seen in Algeria.
Since gaining its independence from France in 1962, Algeria’s political system has
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been dominated by the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN), the socialist party
that spearheaded the nationalist, independence movement against the French
occupation. After the initial success of the battle for Algerian independence the
popularity of the FLN waned and, out of the latent Islamist movement that
began in the 1920s, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) emerged in the late 1980s to
challenge the FLN for control of the county’s political system. The FIS has been
incredibly popular and its popularity has been due in large part to their network
of mosques, which purportedly includes some 9,000 mosques that provide
patrons with social services and access to medical care.72 The mosque has been
so instrumental to the success of the FIS in Algeria that at times the FLN regime
replaced Imams and closed mosques, in addition to placing whole
neighborhoods in Algiers under “virtual siege by heavily armed security forces.”73
Islamic opposition to the Pahlavi monarchy used Iranian mosques in
much the same way as the FIS in Algeria, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
While in exile in France, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was able to build a base of
mass support for the 1979 Islamic Revolution through the vast network of
mosques and Islamic seminaries in Iran. Cassette tapes of his lectures would be
smuggled into Iran and distributed among the mosques. It was through these
cassettes that Khomeini was able to garner mass support for his movement and
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organize massive strikes and demonstrations that eventually led to the end of
the monarchy and the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979.
The emergence of mosques constructed using the funds of political
parties is both new and novel in the history of Islam. Prior to the end of the
colonial period, the religious establishment almost exclusively conducted
mosque construction. Funds collected from zakat or revenues from the awqafs
were used to pay for mosque construction as well as the social services that such
mosques provided. In this way, the function of the mosque remained purely
religious and the charitable giving of the mosque resulted in increased piousness
or, at the very least, loyalty to the local ulama. In the 20th century, with the
emergence of political parties as mosque builders, this has changed dramatically.
The goals of such parties may not be religious or even philanthropic in nature,
but strategic and political. From this perspective, a mosque provides them with a
built-in base for mobilization. As Islam is an integral part of daily life in Muslim
communities, mosques provide a venue that cannot be easily closed down, even
when activities that take place inside conflict with state ideology. Furthermore,
the social welfare that these mosques provide may become associated not with
Islamic charitable giving, but with the political organization providing the
financial backing.
Of course, to say that the practice of mosque construction by
political parties has become dominant in the entirety of the Muslim world would
be a sweeping generalization. Obviously, states like present-day Iran, where
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Islam is more officially part of the state structure, mosques are less commonly
used as a platform for political opposition. Nevertheless it may be concluded
that though no state currently exhibits this trend of political and social
mobilization through the construction of mosques and their provision of social
services, during the last sixty years or so almost all states with significant Muslim
populations have experienced this phenomenon at one time or another. As a
result, this trend must be kept in mind when discussing the contemporary nature
of the mosque in Islam.
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Chronology of the “Mosque at Ground Zero” and the Surrounding Debate
The so-called “Ground Zero Mosque,” by most accounts, became a media
sensation in late-May, 2010. However, the publication of plans to construct a 13
story “mosque” close to the site of the September 11, 2001 terrorists attacks on
the World Trade Centers in the heart of New York City were only the most recent
and dramatic media coverage concerning a mosque at ground zero. A mere two
blocks and a two minute drive from the proposed site of the new mosque, now
dubbed Park51, is located a mosque that until recently continued to serve
members of the Muslim community even after the events of 9/11. This then
begs questions like how much of a difference can two blocks or thirteen stories
make? I will discuss my answers to these questions in this paper’s conclusion,
but before a conclusion or any analysis of the nature of Park51 can be made it is
first necessary to present a brief chronology of important events and arguments
surrounding the controversy.
One of the first major news agencies to report on the then-called
Cordoba Project was The New York Times. In an article published on December 8,
2009 The Times describes preliminary plans for an “Islamic Center” at what was
formerly a Burlington Coat Factory located at 45 Park Place. For months, the
article claims, Muslims living in the area had been using the building as a “prayer
space.” Despite its close proximity to Ground Zero, there appeared to be little
opposition to the proposed plan for the center. New York City Mayor, Michael R.
Bloomberg said via spokesman with seemingly little interest that “If its legal, the
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building owners have a right to do what they want,” while a family member of a
9/11 victim touted the proposed center as a “noble effort.” Although this article
raised the “possibility of a backlash from those opposed to a Muslim presence at
Ground Zero,” there was little initial response to either the article or the
proposed project itself outside of the blogosphere, where several right-wing
bloggers commented on the project.
Despite this right-wing opposition, the proposed “Islamic Center” at Park
Place received very little, if any, attention in the media until May, 2010 when the
Associated Press reported that the organizations financing the project “publicly
unveiled the preliminary plan for the project, known as the Cordoba House, at a
meeting of the finance committee of the local community board.” At this
meeting, the finance committee supported the project but acknowledged that it
could neither “approve nor disapprove” of the project’s construction. On the
same day the New York Post also published an article titled “Panel Approves
‘WTC’ mosque” that reported, albeit briefly, the same story.
It was in the wake of these articles, and similar articles published on the
same day, that the media frenzy erupted. Pamela Geller, the author, blogger and
co-founder of the organization Stop the Islamization of America (SIOA), became
one of the loudest voices of opposition. In a post published on May 6, 2010, the
same day that the Associated Press reported on the proposed Cordoba House
and the community board’s backing of the project Geller said, “the only Muslim
center that should be built in the shadow of the World Trade Center is one
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devoted to expunging the Koran and all Islamic teachings of the prescribed
violent jihad and all hateful texts and incitements of violence.”
Though Geller became the face of the mosque opposition, she was not
alone in her condemnation of the project. For the six months that Ground Zero
Mosque remained politically and socially relevant, virtually every media
personality and politician offered up an opinion. Former Speaker of the United
States House of Representatives Newt Gingrich weighed in on the debate saying,
“There should be no mosque near Ground Zero in New York so long as there are
no churches or synagogues in Saudi Arabia. The time for double standards that
allow Islamists to behave aggressively toward us while they demand our
weakness and submission is over.”74 Meanwhile, the 2008 Republican vicePresidential candidate, Sarah Palin, said in a Tweet “Ground Zero Mosque
supporters: doesn't it stab you in the heart, as it does ours throughout the
heartland? Peaceful Muslims, pls refudiate.” To be fair, most commentators
recognized that the Cordoba House had the “right” to be built but questioned
whether choosing a location so close to Ground Zero was inappropriate or
insensitive. Nevertheless, the line separating Islam from Islamism was blurred
repeatedly.
During the course of the debates that came to surround the proposed
Cordoba house, which later changed its name to Park51, several arguments and
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issues emerged. First and foremost among these was whether or not the
“Mosque at Ground Zero” was, in actuality, a mosque. From the outset the
project’s organizer, Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, maintained that Park51 is not a
mosque but a community Islamic community center “modeled after the Jewish
Community Center on Manhattan’s Upper West Side and the 92nd Street Y.”75
The center’s 13 stories will include, among other amenities, a swimming pool,
gym, and basketball court, an auditorium, a restaurant, a library, childcare
services and a 9/11 memorial in addition to two-floors devoted to space for
prayer.76 Still, despite the Imam’s assertions, those opposing the proposed
project continue to call into question their veracity.
Another major question that has come to the forefront of the “Ground
Zero Mosque” debate, asks if the construction of a mosque or Islamic center
reflects an Islamic tradition of mosque construction as a symbol of dominance or
conquest. Many have argued that the original title, Cordoba House, is a clear
reflection of this tradition. If this is the case, Park51 this may be construed to
symbolize Islam’s conquest of the United States on September 11, 2001.
Generally speaking, these have been the two most significant arguments
concerning the nature of Park51 and, as such, will be discussed at length in the
remainder of this study. The first issue to be analyzed will be the “basic nature”
of Park51. As it has already been proven the mosque in Islam has, throughout
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the centuries, been a dynamic rather than static entity and it is through
comparison to these many and varied phases and functions that the lingering
question of “is it a mosque or a community center” will be answered. Following
this analysis, this paper will then seek to evaluate the claim that mosques have
historically been constructed or established at cites of Islamic conquests. Though
this issue was mentioned briefly in the historical overview, in what follows the
issue of mosque construction and establishment as a symbol of conquest will be
more deeply analyzed using historical comparison to determine whether this
symbolism can be verified and related to the controversy surrounding the
establishment of Park51.
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So, what is Park51, Really?
Given the controversy and media frenzy surrounding Park51, a scholarly
examination of its “basic nature” is crucial. The need for such an examination is
not to argue whether or not the project should be permitted to be built. The
New York State Constitution clearly states in Article 1 Section 3 that “the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed in this state to all
humankind.,”77 which means that Park51 may be built so long it can be funded.
Instead, this analysis seeks simply to answer the question, “is Park51 a
community center or a mosque?” To do so, this chapter will first discuss the
ways in which Park51 is representing itself and will then move on to discuss how
these representations compare and contrast with past and present mosque
functions and those of various other religiously-affiliated establishments.
However, it is not enough to end a discussion of Park51 with a definitive answer
to this question as the impact and implications of this answer are equally
important as the answer itself.
For the most part, Park51 has had three public representatives; Imam
Faisal Abdul Rauf, his wife Daisy Khan and developer Sharif Al-Gamal. In an
article published in the International Herald Tribune in December 2009, Al-Gamal
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described the project as looking to “provide a place of peace, a place of services
and solutions for the community, which is always looking for interfaith
dialogue.'' In another article published on May 26, 2010 in the New York Daily
News, Al-Gamal states that Park51 “is a community center, just like a YMCA
(Young Men’s Christian Association) or JCC (Jewish Community Center); the only
difference here is it's Muslim-led.” Meanwhile, Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf has
maintained all along that that Park51 is a community center. “[Park51] will have
prayer space for sure," he says, "but the primary thrust of [it] is to build
community.”78

Park51’s official website further elaborates on the project’s goals as well
as its “basic nature.” According to the website’s vision statement “Park51 is a
center dedicated to providing cultural, social and recreational programs and
services to the Lower Manhattan community, and to helping weave the MuslimAmerican identity into the pluralistic fabric of the United States.”79 The project,
upon completion, will contain “outstanding recreation spaces and fitness
facilities (swimming pool, gym, basketball court), an auditorium, a restaurant
and culinary school, cultural amenities including exhibitions, education
programs, a library reading room and art studios, childcare services, and a
September 11th memorial and quiet contemplation space open to all.”80

78

Samuel Goldsmith, "A House of 'Healing' Muslims Plan 9/11 Memorial at Ground Zero-area
Mosque," New York Daily News, May 26, 2010.
79
“Vision,” Park51, accessed April 23, 2011, last modified 2011, http://park51.org/vision/
80
"Facilities," Park51, accessed April 23, 2011, last modified 2011, http://park51.org/
facilities/.

52

Meanwhile, in its frequently asked questions section, it stresses that “Park51 is
not a mosque. It is a cultural and community center. You may pray at the
adjacent PrayerSpace, which is a non-for-profit completely independent of
Park51. The Community Center and the PrayerSpace share the same landlord,
Soho Properties, Inc, whose partners serve on the board of Park51.”81

Assuming that Park51 is able to accomplish the goals that it has set forth
for itself, it will be possible to easily liken it to the Manhattan JCC and the various
Manhattan YMCAs. Both the YMCA and JCC have recreational and fitness centers
in addition to offering child-care and various educational programs. In this
respect, Park51 will have succeeded in its mission. Where Park51 begins to
diverge from the YMCA is in the arena of religion. In recent years, the YMCA has
attempted to separate itself from its Christian roots. It refers to itself more often
as “The Y” as opposed to the YMCA and, though the national website briefly
mentions “a mission to put Christian principles into practice through programs
that build a healthy spirit, mind and body,”82 no further mention of Christianity is
made. In the mission statement on the YMCA of Greater New York’s website, the
word Christian is decidedly absent; its mission statement reads “The YMCA of
Greater New York is a community service organization which promotes positive
values through programs that build spirit, mind and body, welcoming all people,
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with a focus on youth.”83 Please note, that the term “Christian principles” has
been replaced with “positive values,” reflecting a move towards secularization of
the organization.

While Park51 is decidedly different in in its religious affiliation than the
YMCA today, its religiously based nature can be easily paralleled with that of the
JCC. Before this parallel nature can be elaborated on, however, it is necessary to
discuss the so-called prayer space that will be located in, and shares an address
with, Park51. As Park51 and PrayerSpace are two separate organizations it
appears that, at a glance, Park51 is not a mosque. However, this does not mean
that there is not a mosque located at 51 Park Place. The line between prayer
space and mosque, in this case, is very thin, indeed.

According to PrayerSpace’s website, “upon completion it will have the
capacity to accommodate approximately 2,000 people,” and “will offer a range
of services and religious programming, including Qur’an classes, Qur’anic
recitation, Islamic sciences, Arabic, and others.”84 In general, and for most of
history, these have been the primary functions of the mosque. The functions of
PrayerSpace specifically resemble those of mosques throughout Islamic history
as Islamic education has been a prominent mosque function since advent of
Islam in 622CE.
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It is easy, however, to call the two stories inside 51 Park Place a prayer
space instead of a mosque. The images of major mosques like the Blue Mosque
in Istanbul, the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem and the Umayyad mosque in
Damascus have been ingrained into the collective American subconscious and
are the standard to which all mosques are, albeit unknowingly, held. By this
logic, a mosque must be a grand, domed structure with minarets. In reality
however, and particularly in the United States and Europe, virtually any space
may be utilized as a mosque. A mosque is, literally translated from the Arabic
masjid, is merely a place of prostration. Though minarets and domed roofs are
common in mosques in the so-called Muslim world, they are not strictly
necessary and many mosques in the United States, Park51 included, do not have
them. Internally, mosques have few mandatory features. While most contain a
minbar85 and a mihrab,86 but neither is strictly necessary. Really, the only
explicitly mandated requirement is that prayer be directed towards the Ka’ba.
That prayer and Islamic education will be conducted within this prayer space is
enough to qualify it as a mosque.

This does not, however, mean that the entirety of Park51, in and of itself,
is a mosque. Instead, Park51 is a community center with a mosque inside. It is
this fact that differentiates it from the nearby JCC. In JCC Manhattan’s mission
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statement, the religious nature of the community center is made explicitly clear.
It reads:
The mission of The Jewish Community Center in Manhattan is to
build an inclusive Jewish community that celebrates the strength
of diversity. We are a home for individuals and families of all
backgrounds to grow and to learn, and to care about and deepen
their connections to one another. Rooted in Jewish values, our
cultural, social, educational, and recreational programs offer
multiple pathways into the richness of community life for
members of all ages.87
Although the JCC offers Hebrew language courses, Jewish religion and
culture courses and holiday celebrations, the JCC is not, nor does it contain, a
temple.
For now, Park51, is not a mosque while the PrayerSpace within it, is. Only
time will tell whether this is the norm or the exception. One may only assume
that as the Muslim population in the United States continues to increase, so too
will the need and desire for Islamic community centers. If the majority of such
projects contain a mosque overseen by the community center, then it may stand
to reason that the prayer space in Park51’s being a separate organization is a
purely political move aimed at minimizing media hype and that it is a mosque
that serves a litany of social services to the community, Muslim and non-Muslim
alike. On the other hand, if future projects leave room for a prayer space, but
leave its maintenance to outside organizations it would stand to reason that they
are Islamic community centers with mosques inside. It would not be entirely
unusual for a mosque to serve as a community center, given the myriad
87
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functions the mosque has served since 622CE. Some of the earliest Muslim
communities in the United States stated that, in establishing mosques, their
“goal was to have [it] become the social center of the community.”88 Thus, the
mosque in the United States has always been a veritable social center of sorts,
and the addition of recreational facilities would only expand on this function.
This begs the question, “how can the two be differentiated?” I argue that
that this differentiation can be made by examining the leadership of both
institutions. If the leadership of the community center and the prayer space is
the same, then it would be difficult to argue that the two are separate, especially
if the Imam serves on the board of directors. Until recently, this was the case
with Park51. Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf served on the Park51 Board of Directors
and served as the Imam for the prayer space. Recently, he has stepped down as
the Imam in what can only be seen as an attempt to quiet public discontent.
However Sherif Al-Gamal, who also serves on the Park51 Board of Directors, is
the landlord of the Park Place property and leases space to both PrayerSpace
and Park5189. This appears to indicate that the “it’s not a mosque” rhetoric is
clearly politically motivated and that, if public opinion allowed and 9/11 never
happened, Park51 may have been called a mosque. As it stands however, Park51
remains a community center with a mosque inside.
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However, it is not enough to end a discussion of Park51 with a definitive
answer to this question as the impact and implications of this answer are equally
important as the answer itself. It is clear that the mosque throughout history has
served as a social institution so it should come as no surprise that The original
title, The Cordoba House, had obvious links to Islamic history (which will be
discussed at length in the following section) whereas the new title is removed
from religion and entrenched in the physical geography of the city. While at a
basic level this switch is aimed at “at minimizing media hype,” the motives and
implications of this seemingly unimportant name change run much deeper.
While to some in the Pamela Geller camp, this change reflects an attempt by the
Imam to hide the project from public scrutiny, in reality it represents a major
compromise and sacrifice on the part of the Muslim community in New York at
the expense of American Muslims as a whole. They have a clear legal right to
build their project and name it as they see fit. In changing the title of the project
they damaged the strength of the Muslim community in America’s strength and
ability to oppose anti-Islamic sentiments.
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The Cordoba Issue
Perhaps one of the most poignant controversies surrounding the Park51
controversy is its proximity to Ground Zero, the site where 2,752 people, some
of them Muslim, lost their lives as a direct result of Islamic extremism.90 Many
have claimed that the construction of an Islamic center, mosque or otherwise, so
close to Ground Zero is insensitive. Others have likened this insensitivity to
placing a Japanese commemorative plaque in Pearl Harbor, or building a
Christian convent in Auschwitz. While this particular study has argued that
although Park51 is not in and of itself a mosque but does contain a mosque, it is
necessary to examine these arguments and theories.
The analogies mentioned above likely arose as a result of Park51’s
original title, The Cordoba House, which draws on the Islamic conquest of Spain
and the great mosque at Cordoba. Though the establishment of the Great
Mosque in Cordoba was briefly discussed in an earlier chapter, it would be
prudent to discuss it again in more depth and detail in order to better
understanding the arguments that the invocation of the name Cordoba has given
rise to.
The conquest of Visigoth Spain began in 711CE but it was not until 756CE
that an Emirate independent of the Umayyad Caliphate was established with
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Cordoba serving as its capital city.91 This Muslim political presence in Spain
continued until 1492 when Emir Muhammad XII surrendered the last remaining
Muslim-governed territories to Queen Isabella I.92 It is important to note is that,
though weak, the Islamic Caliphate in Spain was able to maintain political
sovereignty and legitimacy even after the fall of the Mongol invasion and
subsequent fall of the Abbasids in 1258CE.
Although the Umayyads fled Syria following the rise of the Abbasids in
750, it was not until 785 that construction was begun on the Great Mosque of
Cordoba. The controversy arises with subsequent interpretations of the Great
Mosque’s foundation as “a symbol of dynastic conquest,93” rather than a means
to an end, i.e. a mosque for Friday prayer. Perhaps this is a result the process
involved; the Great Mosque was built on the site of a church, Saint Vincent’s,
which ‘Abd al-Rahman I had previously purchased and demolished.94
As was previously mentioned, mosque construction in conquered
territories was not an uncommon practice during the Muslim expansion (though
I do not necessarily believe that the construction was an intentional symbol of
that conquest, least of all in Cordoba). The Islamic state did not encourage or
force the local Spanish population to convert to Islam mainly because it led to a
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loss in revenue as non-Muslims were subjected to higher rates of taxation.95
Thus, the population of Islamic Spain remained heterogeneous. It was this
heterogeneity, in fact, that led to a number of uprisings and revolts. However,
the Emir’s brutal suppression of these of these uprisings did not reflect a
tradition of Muslim versus infidel, but a desire to maintain political power.96
To claim that this practice of building religious spaces in conquered
territories is unique to Islam would be to ignore glaring historical realities that
point toward the contrary. Throughout the entirety of the Crusades, conversion
was as much of a goal as the conquest of Jerusalem.97 Mosques and churches
alike were built and converted depending on who emerged the victor in a
particular territory, not necessarily as a symbol of victory but as a consequence
of need.
By and large, over the centuries Cordoba became a hub of culture and
learning in, what was then, pre-Enlightenment era Europe. Art and poetry
flourished, merging pre-Islamic and Islamic traditions with those of the Greeks
and Persians.98 Cordoba also became a major intellectual center, housing one of
the largest and most well-stocked libraries in the Islamic world.99 Keeping these
facts in mind and comparing them to the mission statement of provided by the
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Park51 Executive Board, it would appear that the title of “the Cordoba House”
would have been incredibly appropriate for the project. Park51 seeks
intercultural cooperation and education and Cordoba, as the capital of Muslim
Spain, achieved the same.
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Conclusion
The mosque, as can be easily determined from the preceding pages, is
not a monolith. From its earliest institutional inception, this was made clear. The
Prophet’s mosque met the needs of the early religious community in addition to
their political, economic and social ones. It is important to note, however, that as
time progressed these functions have adapted and fluctuated in response to
historical political, economic and social realities. Thus, the mosque has been a
dynamic institution capable of adapting to the circumstances of the society in
which it has operated.
In periods where a strong, centralized government was able to provide
for the political and economic needs of the people, as was witnessed under
Ummayad and Abbasid Caliphs, the mosque was largely relegated to social and
religious affairs. Conversely, in periods where the existing government was
unable to fulfill its duties, like Egypt in the 20th century, the mosque emerged as
a politicized entity seeking to gain political clout by serving the economic and
social interests of the people.
Given its dynamic nature, it is not surprising that the mosque in
traditionally non-Islamic societies would adapt to the perceived needs for the
Muslim community. More specifically, in the United States where Muslims face
discrimination and violence, it is not surprising that the mosque would be
partnered with a community center. Though I am not Muslim, I can imagine that
names like “Young Men’s Christian Association” and “Jewish Community Center”
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might deter me from buying a membership pass to workout, swim or seek
childcare. These titles, which apparently do so without malicious intent, exclude
those outside the specified group. Park51, as an Islamic community center
containing a mosque, is merely a natural response to the continued, whether de
jure or de facto, of the Islamic communities marginalized, excluded and
segregated status in American society.
I realize that this study of the mosque has failed to argue whether Park51
should or should not be constructed. This does not represent a lapse in research,
but rather a conscious decision to avoid arguments based in morals and ethics.
In the end this is what the “should Park51 be built” question comes down to a
question of “is it right to build Park51?” No amount of research could definitively
answer this question as it is a task for philosophers and social scientists to tackle
(of course we can seek to answer such questions! It does not mean the answer is
binding or indisputable but this is precisely what we should be doing).
Nonetheless, given the multitude of opinions and, in particular the rationality
behind them I will, in closing, offer my opinion concerning the proposed Park51
community center.
First and foremost, Islam is not hell-bent on the destruction of America,
American values or the so-called American way of life. Like any other minority
group, Muslims in the United States want to retain their individual religious
customs and practices in the face of a society that demands homogeneity.
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Keeping this in mind, the proposed construction of Park51 four blocks from
Ground Zero is not symbolic of Islam’s domination of the West. It is symbolic of
New York City’s Muslim Community’s need for space and inexpensive realestate. Simply stated it would be wildly inappropriate to hold New York City’s
Muslims responsible for the actions of 19 foreign hijackers representing an
impossibly small minority of religious extremists.
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Summary
Since September 11, 2001 the American people have been consistently
bombarded with media reports concerning Arabs, Islam, Muslims and the
mosque. These terms are often accompanied by loaded concepts like Islamic
fundamentalism, extremism, and terrorism. This has led to a widespread belief
among those with little exposure to the cultures, practices and histories of Arabs
and Muslims that the words Arab, Muslim and terrorist can be used in place of
one another. Though such misinterpretations are particularly disturbing in our
increasingly globalized world, this tendency towards Islamaphobia is not a new
development. The historical relationship between the so-called Islamic world
and the “West” has been based largely on misrepresentation and
misinformation. Thus, present-day conflation of words like Arab, Muslim and
terrorist are not surprising but merely a continuation of historical practice.
This conflation of terms can be easily noted in relation to the mosque.
The mosque is often represented as the tangible manifestation of Islam. Very
rarely is the mosque mentioned in today’s media without suggesting its
suspected links to terrorism. This is a serious problem, as the mosque is not a
static institution. While it primarily functions as a religious institution,
throughout Islamic history its functions have waned and waxed to meet the
social, political and economic needs of the Muslim community. While it is
possible to generalize the broad-spectrum functions of the mosque during
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certain eras of Islamic history (i.e. the life of the Prophet, the Ottoman Empire,
the 20th Century, etc.) it is important that the mosque does not, nor did it ever,
exist in a vacuum.
Given the current fixation with Islam and the general lack of accurate
information concerning the mosque, I decided to focus my Capstone project on
the dynamic nature of the mosque as an institution. The project examines the
many and varied functions that the mosque has served since the advent of Islam
in the 7th century. It would be impossible, given the scope of the Capstone
project to discuss the functions every mosque of each sect of Islam. As a result,
this project generalizes the functions of the mosque in six distinct periods; during
the time of the Prophet of Islam, his immediate successors, the Umayyads, the
Abbasids, the Ottomans as well as the 20th Century.
Keeping this historical overview in mind, the project then focuses in on
the “Ground Zero Mosque” debate that captured media attention in summer
2010. This debate focused on the construction of an Islamic community center,
four blocks from Ground Zero, and whether such a structure ought to be
considered offensive to the victims of 9/11. Also debated was whether the
proposed center was a community center or a mosque. Using the historical
overview, this project seeks to provide an answer to this debate. It is important
to note, however, that I was not concerned with presenting ethical arguments
when formulating this portion of the project. The intended goal was to provide
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accurate information about the “Ground Zero Mosque” to determine whether or
not we should call it a mosque, not whether or not it should be built at all.
Throughout the course of this project, I did my best to use historically
reliable sources when available and, when they were not to carefully analyze
conflicting accounts of events and practices to arrive at the most probable truth.
The body of literature concerning the mosque, by and large, reflects Orientalist
interpretations of the “facts.” This means that the facts do not represent the
mosque as it “is,” but the mosque as viewed from the Western, usually Christian
perspective. Thus, the mosque is usually defined by nature of its being unWestern, non-Christian and generally backwards. This trend made researching
particularly challenging but in the end, after extensively reading books, scholarly
journals, news articles and educational internet pages, I was able to access
enough scholarly material to offer an account that is as objective and factual as
possible.

